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Natural hazards and urban policies in
Mexico City
François Mancebo
EDITOR'S NOTE
Translation: Brian Keogh
1 Mexico City, with over 18 million inhabitants, is the most populous metropolitan area in
the world. The city, which was initially built according to a grid pattern, now covers some
6  000  km².  Polluted  and  noisy,  it  has  for  a  long  time  suffered  from  numerous
environmental and pollution problems, exacerbated by its geographical situation. Mexico
is crossed by two mountain ranges, the Sierra Madre Occidental and the Sierra Madre
Oriental,  which come together to the south of a volcanic cordillera.  It  is  here at the
southern point of the central Mexican plateau that Mexico City is located, at an altitude
of 2 240 metres and close to the volcanic cordillera (map 1). 
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Map 1. Mexico and distrito Federal. 
2 Mexico  City  is  located  in  a  basin  created  by  the  high  mountains  surrounding  it,  a
topography that aggravates the effects of the severe air pollution suffered by the city. The
only opening in the mountains is in the north-east, which is the source of the dominant
winds that enter the basin and push the pollutants towards the mountains, where they
become trapped and concentrated in the basin rather than dispersing. But this is not the
only problem. The unsustainable nature of Mexico City dates back several hundred years
and the city’s problems are many-faceted. 
3 The city is built on the site of former lakes and dried-out marshes. The historic centre was
originally founded as Tenochtitlan, capital of the Aztec empire, on a site occupied over
500 years ago by lake Texcoco. The only viable and functional remains of these lakes can
be found in the south-east of the city, in the borough of Xochimilco. This area will be
discussed at length in the present article. 
4 Drainage of the lakes started long before the arrival of the Spanish. The Aztecs, who had
themselves invaded this area a few centuries earlier, had started to drain the lakes and
lagoons to create land for the increasing population and also so that they could build
monuments and temples, taking over the sites of lakeside settlements such as Chalco.
During  the  Spanish  conquest  Mexico  City  was  founded  on  the  site  of  Tenochtitlan
(Musset, 1991), and lake Texcoco and the other lakes in the area were gradually drained
from the time of colonisation until the start of the 20th century. This gave rise to a soft
alluvial subsoil, over 6 metres thick. The soil compacts regularly, at a rate of about 6 cm
per year. This gradual process causes the soil to move and buildings to collapse, a sort of
permanent "creeping disaster". One of the greatest ironies is that Mexico City, certainly
one of the biggest cities in the world, has developed on one of the earth’s most unstable
soils (Tobriner, 1988). 
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5 Furthermore, the entire city is located in a basin, in a former wetland area, surrounded
by mountains.  Originally,  rainwater  and water  from melting  snow in  the  mountains
flowed into the Mexico Basin then infiltrated the soil, feeding the surface aquifers. Since
the area was drained, it has been subjected alternately to devastating floods and long
periods of  drought,  with calamitous water management adding to the problems.  The
indirect  effects  are  numerous.  When  the  wetlands  were  drained,  the  air  became
increasingly polluted as particles remained in suspension. In 1988, when lake Texcoco
was partially refilled by effluent from the city, the pollutant concentrations in the air
dropped immediately over the entire metropolitan area. 
6 Finally,  the region is  also subject  to considerable tectonic stresses that cause violent
earthquakes and volcanic activity. The two volcanic peaks, Popocatepetl and Iztaccíhuatl,
rising to over 5 000 m are eloquent reminders of this instability. 
 
A metropolis plagued by dangers 
7 Floods, landslides, subsidence, volcanism, earthquakes – it would be difficult to find a
more dangerous site. Mexico City is one of the most unbearable and most vulnerable
cities on earth, exposed to a combination of so-called natural hazards, poorly controlled
technological  hazards  stemming  from  heavy  industry,  pollution,  including  an
accumulation of air pollutants, and diminishing local resources, particularly water. These
different components interact in series to create specific disasters. The dangers to which
the city is exposed are euphemistically called "complex hazards". This concept covers a
wide spectrum of risks since the urban problems resulting from the breakdown in the
social fabric after any kind of catastrophe are part of these “complex hazards”. 
8 The notorious earthquake of 19 September 1985 translated this "complex hazard" into
reality. The massive vibrations that accompanied the earthquake temporarily modified
the  structure  of  the  alluvial  soil,  which  in  places  became  quite  literally  “liquid”,
swallowing up people and buildings.  Elsewhere,  the vibrations caused landslides,  and
more specifically a sudden vertical settling of highly plastic soils (photo 1). This caused
extremely serious damage to poorly maintained buildings and those that did not meet
even the most basic construction standards for this type of high-risk area. The homes of
180 000 people were either destroyed or damaged. The collapse of six buildings alone cost
the lives of 1 619 people (Gómez, 1991). A particular feature of this earthquake was that it
destroyed  modern  buildings  with  high  occupancy  rates  (international  hotels  and
hospitals). Five hospitals collapsed completely, reducing the city’s capacity to care for the
sick and injured by 28 %, which exacerbated the disaster even further. The number of
human casualties from the catastrophe – over 6 000 dead – could have been much higher
if it had occurred a few hours earlier when the city was asleep instead of when people
were on their way to work. In addition to those who died or were made homeless, all the
employees of the 1 200 small industries in the city centre, an area that was particularly
hard  hit,  lost  their  jobs.  The  resulting  urban unrest  in  1986  together  with  financial
scandals among the elite led to the population questioning the government’s legitimacy,
marking  the  beginning  of  the  end  for  the  PRI  (Institutional  Revolutionary  Party)
hegemony that had lasted for more than 50 years. 
 
Natural hazards and urban policies in Mexico City
Journal of Alpine Research | Revue de géographie alpine, 95-2 | 2009
3
Photo 1. 1985’s earthquake in Mexico: building collapse. 
Boise State University, 1987.
9 The  combination  of  "earthquake  +  alluvial  soil  +  inappropriate  buildings"  appeared
clearly  in  the  ex-post  assessment  of  the  different  levels  of  vulnerability  of  the  city’s
buildings. The higher the buildings and the greater the plasticity of the soil, the greater
the damage suffered… Furthermore, among the buildings built on the lake bed, the rigid
structures (stones and masonry) proved more resistant than flexible structures (such as
steel). It was the most central areas, and buildings of between 6 and 20 storeys in these
areas, that suffered the most serious damage (Degg, 1989). Other types of building that
were seriously affected were small apartment blocks: small low-rise buildings combining
apartments and shops in the city centre, as well as rental apartment blocks and small 19th
century houses, some of them run-down, housing large numbers of people. 
10 The  consequences  of  this  earthquake  were  atypical  compared  with  those  of  similar
catastrophes.  In  general,  vulnerability  increases  with  poverty  and  unofficial  housing
(Wisner, 1993). In the Mexico City earthquake, this was far from the case. Most deaths
occurred in concrete/steel buildings in the city centre, in tourist hotels, hospitals and the
historic areas that were undergoing gentrification in the heart of the alluvial basin. While
many of the poor people who worked in the devastated buildings lost their jobs, it was the
more wellto-do inhabitants who suffered the most serious consequences in terms of loss
of life and property. In fact, the millions who lived in extreme poverty on the peripheries
of the city lived in buildings that were constructed on more solid ground that was less
sensitive to vibrations. In addition, their low, flimsy houses, randomly built from salvaged
stone and masonry, proved to be more resistant to the tremors, and even those that
collapsed caused fewer victims. This is a reminder perhaps that poverty and vulnerability
are  not  always  synonymous  even  though  they  are  –  sometimes  wrongly  –  related
(Mancebo, 2006-1). 
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Hazards and sustainability make their appearance in
urban development policies 
11 The  1985  earthquake  dramatically  changed  Mexico  City’s  urban  development  policy.
Previously, urban planning was as rigid as it was ineffective and was based solely on land
use. Until the end of the 1960s, Mexico City expanded without any control in the form of
urban planning rules. New areas sprung up one after the other, creating something akin
to non-cities. Policies focussed on getting rid of these areas. Then, under the influence of
international  organisations  and  pressure  from  the  Interamerican  Development  Bank
(IDB), extremely normative technical terms started to be introduced in relation to urban
planning: the Plano Director and Plano Metropolitano (Master Plan, Metropolitan Plan) for
example. This grand planning period saw new types of urban residential developments
spring up in the outlying areas,  financed by national  and international  subsidies  for
creating low-income housing (Guerrien,  2004)  This  vision was fully  expressed by the
United  Nations  in  the  human  settlement  concept.  Applied  to  urban expansion,  human
settlement,  with its  new spatial  divisions,  quickly found its place in Planos  Reguladores
(Master Plans). 
 
New measures rapidly manipulated 
12 In 1985, at the time of the earthquake, demographic growth and urban sprawl had slowed
down considerably. New types of problems had to be faced, even though the city was still
suffering from its previous hypertrophy.  In fact,  while urban pressure decreased and
access to services improved, spatial segregation intensified. This could be seen in the
landscape, which provided a stark reminder of the widening gap between social extremes
(Banzo, 1998). The atypical nature of the consequences of the earthquake – it was not the
poor  who lost  their  lives,  but  the  rich,  and  it  was  not  the  shanty  towns  that  were
devastated but the relatively new apartment blocks – and its economic cost revealed the
true extent of the city’s socio-spatial disparities. The material damage of the earthquake,
but particularly its symbolic impact,  led to a radical rethinking of urban policy from
1987-88 onwards, with environmental quality and levels of vulnerability being seen as
factors to be considered. 
13 Toward  the  end  of  the  1980s,  planning  recommendations  from  international
organisations, and in particular the World Bank, also changed. Specialised terms were
introduced concerning local  governance and sustainable development:  competitiveness, 
liveability, good governance and management, bankability. This type of language gave rise to
the concept of the sustainable city. Buena gobernabilidad became the Mexican version of the
World Bank’s good governance. Its aim was to consolidate human settlements by making
their  environ-ment,  in  the  broad  sense  of  the  term,  viable:  drainage  and  sewerage,
alleviation  of  various  environmental  problems  such  as  noise  and  pollution,  safety
measures, etc. This policy was to be applied not only to Mexico City but to other Mexican
cities. 
14 The least that can be said is that the attitude of Mexico City’s politicians towards this new
approach was ambiguous. On the one hand, they used it to create a framework for new
urban policies, which supposedly drew conclusions from the 1985 earthquake. But on the
other hand, they were still tied to their traditional vision of state control and showed
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little enthusiasm. Although the approach seemed attractive, it did not really meet the
development needs of a metropolitan area such as Mexico City, with its history of elitism
and building programmes undertaken too quickly with no regulatory framework. 
15 In fact, the people of Mexico City did not identify with an administrative approach that
simply had an appearance of being rigorous. The inhabitants themselves took on roles in
this  new  approach  and  created  a  vocabulary  that  they  modified  to  suit  their  own
interests.  The key word was comunidad (community) derived from the notion of good
governance.  It  was a  new term that  was used in reference to the spatial  limits  of  a
neighbourhood with which a person felt a temporary sense of solidarity. Rather than talk
about  colonia  irregular  (irregular  settlements)  when referring to  their  urban districts,
created haphazardly from salvaged materials under the watchful indulgent eye of the
authorities whose clientele they form, the inhabitants defended themselves against their
critics  as  a  comunidad.  It  became  a  way  of  preventing  their  buildings  from  being
demolished and also helped them to obtain subsidies. The term comunidad was seen as a
magic  potion.  Its  use  can be  traced back to  the  time of  the  1985  earthquake,  when
neighbourhood community organisations were officially created to serve as a link with
government departments (Annis,  1988).  All  kinds of  problems could be solved in the
context of the comunidad and it was a term that started to crop up everywhere. It is
interesting to note that this notion became increasingly mentioned at a time when the
solidity of community links within Mexico City had never been so threatened (Mancebo
F., 2004). This situation raises the question of the links that form between actors and local
areas in the context of the new urban development policy. 
 
Clearly identified hazards, relevant responses… but practically
nothing implemented 
16 Earthquakes are the most spectacular and the most vivid hazard in the collective memory
of Mexicans, but there are many others in Mexico City: floods, landslides, subsidence,
fires,  dangerous and poorly maintained industrial installations, and huge traffic jams.
When combined,  these  natural  and industrial  hazards  become complex,  turning  this
metropolis, characterised by its incredible anarchical urban sprawl, into an unbearable
place to live. Consequently, even though the 1985 earthquake convinced local politicians
of the need to include risk management in their urban development policies, earthquakes
have not been at the heart of the new approach. Instead, attention has been focussed on
"slow" hazards, namely air and water pollution. 
17 In 1997 a new Plan General de Desarrollo Urbano (General Urban Development Plan) based on
the new policies was drawn up and a sustainable development consultancy was called in
to coordinate the implementation of the plan.  The principal concerns were land use,
urban transport and water management. 
18 Relating water management to land use and identifying the threat of water shortages as a
"slow"  hazard  certainly  made  sense.  The  urban  sprawl  that  was  characterised  by
numerous colonias irregulares, irregular settlements on the periphery of the city, had two
major consequences. A great many colonias were set up in mountainous areas with no
sewage treatment facilities: sewage was therefore evacuated towards the valley where it
infiltrated the soil and polluted the surface aquifers. Indeed, the entire city had facilities
that could treat only a minute fraction of its sewage and was therefore causing massive
pollution to ground water supplies: the flow of wastewaters known as aguas negras (black
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waters) and chemicals from fertilisers, resulted in high concentrations of heavy metals
and bacterial pathogens in the water. 
19 The problem is not just with the quality of  water,  but also the quantity.  Indeed,  the
demand for water from the whole of the metropolitan area of Mexico City is extremely
high, the result of rapid urban growth due to government centralisation policies, the high
concentration of industry and the demographic explosion. Between 1960 and 1970 the
urbanised area grew by almost 50 %, and the same happened between 1970 and 1980. The
Mexico basin aquifers have a very long recharge time. Their use should therefore be
limited to their very slow recharge rate; otherwise they will be exhausted within a few
generations. But this is not what is happening: in the Mexico basin, 42 m3 of water are
extracted per second whereas the recharge rate is barely 23 m3 per second. Furthermore,
the colonias irregulares on the periphery of the basin are situated on aquifer recharge sites:
urbanisation prevents water from penetrating the soil and reaching the aquifers, making
the situation even more dramatic. 
20 The problems created by overuse of ground water do not simply concern availability of
water. In fact, the "soft" soils described above are rich in clay. Their stability is closely
linked to their hydration level. When ground water becomes exhausted, the soil dries and
the clayey layers become compressed. This results in subsidence – often sudden – of the
soils in the whole of the Mexico basin: apartment blocks sink and collapse, and all the
buildings become fragile.  In short,  the calamitous management of  water resources is
causing similar devastation to what happened in the 1985 earthquakes, albeit through a
slower process. 
21 Land and water use is thus at the root of the city’s "slow" hazards and it is the poor
management of these two resources that make Mexico City an unbearable place to live. It
is  not  surprising  that  these  two  issues  were  primordial  in  the  first  Plan  General  de
Desarrollo Urbano. However, although the policy itself is appropriate, its effectiveness is
largely compromised by the fact that attention is focussed solely on the historic centres,
tourist districts and residential areas. The extremely pernicious effects of this differential
treatment of centres and peripheral areas are destroying in fine the laudable efforts of the
new policy. 
 
Autopsy of a failure: imported sustainability and
ignored representations 
22 The plan includes  programmes to encourage companies to  save water  and others  to
promote the recovery of rain water in private homes and public buildings (hospitals,
schools, etc.). In terms of technical structures, a water supply network that should cut
down on the  number  of  leaks  is  planned,  as  well  as  sewerage  and water  treatment
structures at the outlets of deep lined/stone/tunnels for the evacuation of sewerage and
storm water so as avoid contamination of the ground water (Carmen Durán de Bazúa,
2003). There are even plans to create separate drinking-water and non drinking-water
systems. But,  aside from the extreme uncertainty surrounding the implementation of
such plans, the measures do not concern the outlying areas of the city. 
23 These peripheral areas and the areas beyond are not just being neglected, they are also
being used to the benefit of the more central areas. The sustainability of Mexico City’s
relatively rich centres is being orchestrated at the expense of the sustainability of poorer
Natural hazards and urban policies in Mexico City
Journal of Alpine Research | Revue de géographie alpine, 95-2 | 2009
7
areas. Such so-called imported sustainability is by no means a genuine solution to the
problem. Imported sustainability is  a term used when a territory guarantees its  own
sustainable development by making other territories pay the cost of this sustainability:
transferring pollution (exporting waste) or polluting activities, under-priced purchases of
natural resources (Pearce, Markandya, Barbier, 1989). The territory in question covers
the needs of its population by complying with the general conditions of sustainability in
appearance only. Its internal sustainability is guaranteed, in reality, to the detriment of
external sustainable development, since its problems are exported. Looked at in this way,
there is only true sustainability when conditions concerning internal sustainability and
external sustainability are both satisfied. This implies defining areas of action that are
sufficiently extensive. 
24 The term imported sustainability can be used in the case of Mexico City insofar as the
development  plan  provides  for  flood  prevention  by  diverting  the  water  into  the
numerous rivers in the neighbouring state of Hidalgo. Along the same lines, the plan
provides for large protected areas and land reserves aimed at stopping urban sprawl.
Most are situated in the south-west of  Mexico City,  in the delegacion (or borough) of
Xochimilco  (map  2).  Together,  the  delegaciones form  the  Districto  Federal  de  Mexico.
Xochimilco is vital for the entire metropolitan area, since it is here that are found most of
the catchment areas that ensure the supply of water to the capital (Mancebo, 2006-2). 
 
Map 2. Xochimilco chinampas in urban area of Mexico. 
25 But the inhabitants of Xochimilco were not consulted either by their delegacion or by the
authorities of the Distrito Federal. This borough does not have the same water problems as
the rest of the metropolitan area. Even worse, land and water use in Xochimilco (urban
market gardening is practised on marshy land, houses are built in the middle of plots, and
the  remaining  land  is  gradually  being  urbanised)  is  incompatible  with  the  policy  of
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creating protected areas and land reserves. The plan has therefore been rejected but, in
the event that it is implemented, inhabitants have already asked for compensation for the
problems it will create for them. 
26 In  Xochimilco  artificial  agricultural  land  was  created  almost  ten  centuries  ago  by
dredging the mud at the bottom of the lake that occupied the site and using it to create
artificial gardens on floating wattle rafts.  The rafts sank further and further into the
water, ultimately becoming fixed to the bottom of the lake. These artificial gardens, at
first mobile, slowly took root. They were called chinampas. When the wattle reached the
bottom, trees planted on the edges of the plot took root and consolidated the ground. The
long narrow strips often incorrectly referred to as "floating" gardens were an original
form of intensive and diversified agriculture, producing maize, beans, chillies, amarant
but also flowers, in a labyrinth of canals. This form of urban farming directly linked to the
presence of marshy areas close to the initial urban centre contributed to the emergence
of an original type of spatial organisation. The role of the chinampas in the history and
economic activity of Mexico City was – and remains – important. 
27 Urban agriculture of this nature has for a long time enabled under-utilised resources to
be put to good use: manpower, space, land. It helps alleviate poverty by providing urban
populations with better diets and higher incomes thanks to the direct and indirect jobs
created, for example in tourism and product distribution. It also helps reduce the cost of
collection, treatment and disposal of waste, since human waste can be transformed into
compost  and  domestic  wastewater  can  be  used  to  irrigate  plants.  The  creation  of
protected zones that would prevent such areas from being used is obviously unacceptable
to the inhabitants of Xochimilco. 
28 Furthermore, while 56% of the area of Xochimilco is still given over to farming or lies
fallow, over 30 % is extremely urbanised, with the trend accelerating. In fact, thirty years
ago Xochimilco was still a rural area completely outside the metropolitan area of Mexico
City. Located close to the capital, this borough has always maintained political, cultural
and economic ties with the capital, including trading agricultural and fish products for
manufactured  goods,  as  well  as  supplying  manpower.  Today,  Mexico  City  literally
surrounds Xochimilco. The area has also been severely disfigured by invasive unofficial
constructions and its borders are being encroached upon by urban sprawl (photo 2). Most
urban growth has taken place unofficially, with buildings springing up in market gardens
or on public land. Pressure is increasing on this type of land, which is acquiring a new
residential  value and becoming a new resource for  inhabitants.  The creation of  land
reserves will cause this resource to disappear. 
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Photo 2. Urban “invasion” in Xochimilco chinampas. Source: F. MANCEBO, 2003.. 
29 The inhabitants of Xochimilco are thus organising protests and constantly taking legal
action through agrarian associations to try and get the plan withdrawn. For them, land is
the only important resource; water is of little interest. Two very different and spatially
defined types of land use can be distinguished: land to be sold and divided into plots and
that used for more intensive farming practices. These are the main sources of revenue for
otherwise relatively poor populations. Creating land reserves and protected areas is thus
an impossible task: regulation is either held up by the numerous legal proceedings or is
deliberately not implemented. 
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Conclusion: Sisyphus in Mexico City 
Source : F. Mancebo, 2006. 
30 In Mexico City, local and national players regularly attempt to address the many hazards
to which the city is exposed but, try as they may, and despite some promising signs, in
the end they seem to make very little progress. It’s a little like Sisyphus trying to push his
rock up the hill, but in this case it is not really the rock that is the problem but rather the
slope. 
31 In other words, the real problem is the substrate composed of territorial representations
and uses of space on which Mexican society is based and on which the rock rolls. 
32 The undesirable effects of the measures that were meant to include sustainability in the
Plan General de Desarrollo Urbano highlight the lack of logic that exists in trying to turn an
unliveable  place  into  one  that  is  liveable  through a  purely  normative  approach and
without including all the areas involved. Mexico City, situated as it is at a high altitude
and with its many different topographies and soils, is one of the best examples of this
reality. 
33 Policies applied to large high-altitude metropolitan areas should therefore, on the one
hand, be applicable to sufficiently large and inclusive areas to prevent a situation of
imported  sustainability,  and  on  the  other  hand  should  combine  management  of
resources, mobility, urban development methods, land use, hazards and "slow" hazards. 
34 Such policies would thus need to be flexible enough to include the differing perceptions
held by various populations concerning priorities as well as changes in these perceptions.
In the case of Mexico City, soil quality (for farming and housing) and land for building
were for a long time the most sought-after resources and the ones that had to be best
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preserved, while air and water were considered inexhaustible. After the 1985 earthquake,
for reasons mentioned above, Mexico City became aware of the importance of water, both
as a limited resource and as a risk factor. In addition to its use value, it has a strong
option  value,  for  medium-  and  long-term  human  consumption,  as  well  as  a  strong
existence value, even if only for stabilising the soils. 
35 But the inhabitants of Xochimilco, who are not subjected to the same constraints as the
rest of the population of Mexico City, do not share this point of view. For them, essential
resources  are  land  and  building  plots.  They  do  not  see  the  point  in  introducing
regulations that prevent them from benefiting from these resources in order to preserve
a water resource that they do not consider to be important, since it provides them with
nothing,  and  for  which  they  receive  no  compensation.  The  definition  of  resources
depends on the society, the time and the circumstances. Unless the sensitivity of societies
to resources and their appropriation of underlying problems is taken into account, any
sustainability policy will almost certainly be doomed to failure. 
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ABSTRACTS
Mexico City is located at an altitude of over 2 000 metres where it occupies an attractive but
hazardous site hemmed in by the Sierra Madre and volcanic mountain ranges.The site is one of
the most disaster-prone locations in the world, threatened by a combination of natural hazards,
poorly  controlled  technological  hazards  created  by  the  city’s  heavy  industry,  pollution  –
particularly air pollution and diminishing local resources, the most seriously threatened being
water. Since the devastating earthquake of 1985, Mexico’s planners have attempted to address
the questions of hazards and sustainability in the city’s new urban development policies. But
although the various hazards have been clearly identified and appropriate responses determined,
the latter have remained for the most part unimplemented. A normative approach that does not
take into account the entire metropolitan area but uses the peripheral zones to improve the
sustainability  of  central  areas  (a  kind  of  imported  sustainability  at  the  metropolitan  scale)
explains this situation. Local and national players regularly attempt to address the many hazards
to which the city is exposed but ultimately seem to make very little progress. Their situation is a
little like that of Sisyphus trying to push his rock up the hill, but in this case it is not really the
rock that is the problem but rather the slope. In other words, the real problem for Mexico City is
the  substrate  composed  of  local  representations  and  uses of  space  that  underlie  the  very
foundations of Mexican society – and on which the rock rolls.
L’agglomération de Mexico, à plus de 2 000 mètres d’altitude, adossée à la Sierra Madre et la
Cordillère Volcanique est assise sur un site accueillant mais redoutable. Il s’agit d’un des endroits
les  plus  exposés  du  globe,  soumis  à  une  combinaison  de  risques  naturels,  de  risques
technologiques souvent mal maîtrisés dus à des industries lourdes, de nuisances, de cumul des
polluants  et  d’un  épuisement  des  ressources  locales  utilisables,  tout  particulièrement  les
ressources en eau. Après le séisme dévastateur de 1985, les acteurs de l’aménagement de Mexico
tentent d’intégrer risques et durabilité dans la définition de nouvelles politiques urbaines. Mais,
si les risques sont bien identifiés et des réponses sont données, leur applicabilité est quasi-nulle.
Une  approche  normative  et  n’incluant  pas  l’ensemble  de  l’agglomération,  mais  utilisant  les
périphéries pour améliorer la durabilité des centres (sorte de durabilité importée à l’échelle de la
métropole)  explique  cette  situation.  Comme  dans  le  mythe  de  Sisyphe,  acteurs  locaux  et
nationaux tentent de faire remonter la pente au rocher du risque mais ce dernier finit toujours
par redescendre ? C’est qu’en réalité le problème n’est pas le rocher. Le problème, c’est la pente,
c’est-à-dire le substrat fait de représentations territoriales et d’usages de l’espace qui fondent la
société mexicaine, sur laquelle roule le rocher. 
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